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ABSTRACT
Preserving privacy of users is a key requirement of web-scale analyt-
ics and reporting applications, and has witnessed a renewed focus
in light of recent data breaches and new regulations such as GDPR.
We focus on the problem of computing robust, reliable analytics in a
privacy-preserving manner, while satisfying product requirements.
We present PriPeARL, a framework for privacy-preserving analyt-
ics and reporting, inspired by dierential privacy. We describe the
overall design and architecture, and the key modeling components,
focusing on the unique challenges associated with privacy, cover-
age, utility, and consistency. We perform an experimental study
in the context of ads analytics and reporting at LinkedIn, thereby
demonstrating the tradeos between privacy and utility needs, and
the applicability of privacy-preserving mechanisms to real-world
data. We also highlight the lessons learned from the production
deployment of our system at LinkedIn.
1 INTRODUCTION
Preserving privacy of users is a key requirement of web-scale
data mining applications and systems such as web search, recom-
mender systems, crowdsourced platforms, and analytics applica-
tions, and has witnessed a renewed focus in light of recent data
breaches and new regulations such as GDPR [35]. As part of their
products, online social media and web platforms typically provide
dierent types of analytics and reporting to their users. For exam-
ple, LinkedIn provides several analytics and reporting applications
for its members as well as customers, such as ad analytics (key
campaign performance metrics along dierent demographic dimen-
sions), content analytics (aggregated demographics of members
that viewed a content creator’s article or post), and prole view
statistics (statistics of who viewed a member’s prole, aggregated
along dimensions such as profession and industry). For such analyt-
ics applications, it is essential to preserve the privacy of members,
since member actions could be considered as sensitive information.
Specically, we want to ensure that any one individual’s action (e.g.,
click on an article or an ad) may not be inferred by observing the
results of the analytics system. At the same time, we need to take
into consideration various practical requirements for the associated
product to be viable and usable.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of computing robust,
reliable analytics in a privacy-preserving manner, while addressing
product requirements such as coverage, utility, and consistency. We
present PriPeARL, a framework for privacy-preserving analytics
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and reporting. We highlight the unique challenges associated with
privacy, coverage, utility, and consistency while designing and im-
plementing our system (§2), and describe the modeling components
(§3) and the system architecture (§4) to address these requirements.
Our approach to preserving member privacy makes use of ran-
dom noise addition inspired by dierential privacy, wherein the
underlying intuition is that the addition of a small amount of appro-
priate noise makes it harder for an attacker to reliably infer whether
any specic member performed an action or not. Our system in-
corporates techniques such as deterministic pseudorandom noise
generation to address certain limitations of standard dierential
privacy and performs post-processing to achieve data consistency.
We then empirically investigate the tradeos between privacy and
utility needs using a web-scale dataset associated with LinkedIn
Ad Analytics and Reporting platform (§5). We also highlight the
lessons learned in practice from the production deployment of our
system at LinkedIn (§6). We nally discuss related work (§7) as well
as conclusion and future work (§8).
2 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM SETTING
We rst provide a brief overview of analytics and reporting systems
at LinkedIn, followed by a discussion of the key privacy and product
requirements for such systems.
2.1 Analytics and Reporting at LinkedIn
Internet companies such as LinkedIn make use of a wide range of
analytics and reporting systems as part of various product oerings.
Examples include ad campaign analytics platform for advertisers,
content analytics platform for content creators, and prole view
analytics platform for members. The goal of these platforms is to
present the performance in terms of member activity on the items
(e.g., ads / articles and posts / member prole respectively), which
can provide valuable insights for the platform consumers. For ex-
ample, an advertiser could determine the eectiveness of an ad
campaign across members from dierent professions, functions,
companies, locations, and so on; a content creator could learn about
the aggregated demographics of members that viewed her article
or post; a member can nd out professions, functions, companies,
locations, etc. that correspond to the largest sources of her prole
views. The platforms are made available typically as a web interface,
displaying the relevant statistics (e.g., impressions, clicks, shares,
conversions, and/or prole views, along with demographic break-
downs) over time, and sometimes also through corresponding APIs
(e.g., ad analytics API). Figure 3 shows a screenshot of LinkedIn’s
ad analytics and reporting platform (discussed in §5.1).
A key characteristic of these platforms is that they admit only a
small number of predetermined query types as part of their user
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interface and associated APIs, unlike the standard statistical data-
base setting that allows arbitrary aggregation queries to be posed.
In particular, our analytics platforms allow querying for the num-
ber of member actions, for a specied time period, together with
the top demographic breakdowns. We can abstractly represent the
underlying database query form as follows.
• “SELECT COUNT(*) FROM table(statType, entity) WHERE
timeStamp ≥ startTime AND timeStamp ≤ endTime AND
dattr = dval ”
In the above query, table(statType, entity) abstractly denotes a
table in which each row corresponds to a member action (event) of
statistics type, statType for entity (e.g., clicks on a given ad), dattr
the demographic attribute (e.g., title), and dval the desired value of
the demographic attribute (e.g., “Senior Director”). In practice, these
events could be preprocessed and stored in a partially aggregated
form so that each row in the table corresponds to the the number of
actions (events) for a (statType, entity,dattr ,dval , the most granular
time range) combination, and the query computes the sum of the
number of member actions satisfying conditions on the desired
time range and the demographic attribute-value pair.
2.2 Privacy Requirements
We next discuss the requirement for preserving the privacy of
LinkedIn members. Our goal is to ensure that an attacker cannot
infer whether a member performed an action (e.g., click on an arti-
cle or an ad) by observing the results shown by the analytics and
reporting system, possibly over time. We assume that the attacker
may have knowledge of attributes associated with the target mem-
ber (e.g., obtained from this member’s LinkedIn prole) as well as
knowledge of all other members that performed similar action (e.g.,
by creating fake accounts that the attacker has then control over).
At rst, it may seem that the above assumptions are strong,
and the aggregate analytics may not reveal information about any
member’s action. However, we motivate the need for such privacy
requirements by illustrating potential attacks in the context of ad
analytics. Consider a campaign targeted to “Senior directors in
US, who studied at Cornell.” As such a campaign is likely to match
several thousands of members, it will satisfy any minimum targeting
threshold and hence will be deemed valid. However, this criterion
may match exactly one member within a given company (whose
identity can be determined from the member’s LinkedIn prole or
by performing search for these criteria), and hence the company-
level demographic breakdowns of ad clicks could reveal whether
this member clicked on the ad or not. A common approach to
reducing the risk of such attacks is to use a (deterministic) minimum
threshold prior to showing the statistics. However, given any xed
minimum threshold k , the attacker can create k − 1 or more fake
accounts that match the same criteria as the target member, and
have these accounts click on the ad so that the attacker can precisely
determine whether the member clicked on the ad from the company-
level ad click count. A larger xed threshold would increase the
eort involved in this attack, but does not prevent the attack itself.
Similarly, we would like to provide incremental privacy protec-
tion, that is, protect against attacks based on incremental obser-
vations over time. We give an example to demonstrate how, by
observing the reported ad analytics over time, a malicious adver-
tiser may be able to infer the identity of a member that clicked on
the ad. Consider an ad campaign targeted to “all professionals in
US with skills, ‘leadership’ and ‘management’ and at least 15 years
of experience.” Suppose that this ad receives a large number of
clicks from leadership professionals across companies initially, and
afterwards, on a subsequent day, receives just one click causing the
ad click breakdowns for ‘title = CEO’ and ‘company = LinkedIn’ to
be incremented by one each. By comparing these reported counts
on adjacent days, the advertiser can then conclude that LinkedIn’s
CEO clicked on the ad.
The above attacks motivate the need for applying rigorous tech-
niques to preserve member privacy in analytics applications, and
thereby not reveal exact aggregate counts. However, we may still
desire utility and data consistency, which we discuss next.
2.3 Key Product Desiderata
2.3.1 Coverage and Utility. It is desirable for the aggregate sta-
tistics to be available and reasonably accurate for as many action
types, entities, demographic attribute/value combinations, and time
ranges as possible for the analytics and reporting applications to
be viable and useful.
2.3.2 Data Consistency. We next discuss the desirable properties
for an analytics platform with respect to dierent aspects of data
consistency for the end user, especially since the platform may not
be able to display true counts due to privacy requirements. We
note that some of these properties may not be applicable in certain
application settings, and further, we may choose to either partially
or fully sacrice certain consistency properties either to achieve
better privacy and/or utility. We discuss such design choices in §3,
§5, and §6.
Consistency for repeated queries (C1): The reported answer should
not change when the same query is repeated (assuming that the
true answer has not changed). For example, the reported number
of clicks on a given article on a xed day in the past should remain
the same when queried subsequently. We treat this property as an
essential one.
Consistency over time (C2): The combined action counts should
not decrease over time. For example, the reported total number of
clicks on an article by members satisfying a given predicate at time
t1 should be at most that at time t2 if t1 < t2.
Consistency between total and breakdowns (C3): The reported
total action counts should not be less than the sum of the reported
breakdown counts. For example, the displayed total number of
clicks on an article cannot be less than the sum of clicks attributed
to members from dierent companies. We do not require an equality
check since our applications typically report only the top few largest
breakdown counts as these provide the most valuable insights about
the members engaging with the product.
Consistency across entity hierarchy (C4): When there is a hierar-
chy associated with the entities, the total action counts for a parent
entity should be equal to the sum of the action counts over the
children entities. For example, dierent ads could be part of the
same campaign, dierent campaigns could be part of a campaign
group, and several campaign groups could be part of an advertiser’s
account.
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Consistency across action hierarchy (C5): When there is a hierar-
chy associated with actions such that a parent action is a prerequi-
site for a child action (e.g., an article would need to be impressed
(shown) to the member, before getting clicked), the count for the
parent action should not be less than the count for the child action
(e.g., the number of impressions cannot be less than the number of
clicks).
Consistency for top k queries (C6): The top k results reported
for dierent choices of k should be consistent with each other. For
example, the top 10 titles and the top 5 titles respectively of members
that clicked on an article should agree on the rst 5 results.
2.4 Problem Statement
Our problem can thus be stated as follows: How do we compute
robust, reliable analytics in a privacy-preserving manner, while ad-
dressing the product desiderata such as coverage, utility, and consis-
tency? How do we design the analytics computation system to meet
the needs of LinkedIn products? We address these questions in §3
and §4 respectively.
3 PRIVACY MODEL AND ALGORITHMS
We present our model and detailed algorithm for achieving privacy
protection in an analytics and reporting setting. Our approach mod-
ies the reported aggregate counts using a random noise addition
mechanism, inspired by dierential privacy [10, 11]. Dierential
privacy is a formal guarantee for preserving the privacy of any indi-
vidual when releasing aggregate statistical information about a set
of people. In a nutshell, the dierential privacy denition requires
that the probability distribution of the released results be nearly
the same irrespective of whether an individual’s data is included as
part of the dataset. As a result, upon seeing a published statistic,
an attacker would gain very little additional knowledge about any
specic individual.
Denition 3.1. [11] A randomized mappingK satises ϵ-dierential
privacy if for all pairs of datasets (D,D ′) diering in at most one
row, and all S ⊆ Ranдe(K),
Pr [K(D) ∈ S] ≤ eϵ · Pr [K(D ′) ∈ S],
where the probability is over the coin ips of K .
Formally, this guarantee is achieved by adding appropriate noise
(e.g., from Laplace distribution) to the true answer of a statistical
query function (e.g., the number of members that clicked on an
article, or the histogram of titles of members that clicked on an
article), and releasing the noisy answer. The magnitude of the noise
to be added depends on the L1 sensitivity of the query (namely, the
upper bound on the extent to which the query output can change,
e.g., when a member is added to or removed from the dataset), and
the desired level of privacy guarantee (ϵ).
Denition 3.2. [11] The L1 sensitivity of a query function, f :
D → Rd is dened as ∆(f ) = maxD,D′ | | f (D) − f (D ′)| |1 for all
pairs of datasets (D,D ′) diering in at most one row.
Theorem 3.3. [11] Given a query function f : D → Rd , the ran-
domized mechanismK that adds noise drawn independently from the
Laplace distribution with parameter ∆(f )ϵ to each of the d dimensions
of f (D) satises ϵ-dierential privacy.
For our application setting, we adopt event-level dierential pri-
vacy [12], in which the privacy goal is to hide the presence or
absence of a single event, that is, any one action of any member.
Under this notion, the sensitivity for the query shown in §2.1 equals
1.
We next describe our approach for adding appropriate random
noise to demographic level analytics, and for performing post-
processing to achieve dierent levels of consistency. We rst present
an algorithm for generating pseudorandom rounded noise from
Laplace distribution for a given query (Algorithm 1), followed by an
algorithm for computing noisy count for certain canonical queries
(Algorithm 2), and nally the main algorithm for privacy-preserving
analytics computation (Algorithm 3), which builds on the rst two
algorithms.
3.1 Pseudorandom Laplace Noise Generation
A key limitation with the standard dierential privacy approach is
that the random noise can be removed, by issuing the same query
many times, and computing the average of the answers. Due to this
reason and also for ensuring consistency of the answer when the
same query is repeated (e.g., the advertiser returning to check the
analytics dashboard with the same ltering criteria), we chose to
use a deterministic, pseudorandom noise generation algorithm. The
idea is that the noise value chosen for a query is xed to that query,
or the same noise is assigned when the same query is repeated.
Given the statistical query, the desired privacy parameter, and
the xed secret, we generate a (xed) pseudorandom rounded noise
from the appropriate Laplace distribution using Algorithm 1. First,
the secret and the query parameters are given as input to the deter-
ministic function, GeneratePseudorandFrac, which returns a pseu-
dorandom fraction between 0 and 1. Treating this obtained fraction
as sampled from the uniform distribution on (0, 1), we apply the
inverse cumulative distribution function (cdf) for the appropriate
Laplace distribution to get the pseudorandom noise. Finally, we
round the noise to the nearest integer since it is desirable for the
reported noisy counts to be integers.
The function, GeneratePseudorandFrac, can be implemented in
several ways. One approach would be to concatenate the query
parameters and the xed secret, then apply a cryptographically
secure hash function (e.g., SHA-256), and use the hash value as
the seed to a pseudorandom number generator that gives a pseu-
dorandom fraction uniformly distributed in between 0 and 1. To
protect against length extension attack and potential collisions, it
may be desirable to avoid keyed hashing and instead use a crypto-
graphically secure and unbiased hash function such as HMAC with
SHA-256 (HMAC-SHA256) [7]. This factor needs to be weighed
against the computational eciency requirements, which could
favor simpler implementations such as applying a more ecient
hash function and scaling the hash value to (0, 1) range, treating
the hash value to be a uniformly distributed hexadecimal string
in its target range. Note that the xed secret is used so that an
attacker armed with the knowledge of the algorithm underlying
GeneratePseudorandFrac as well as the query parameters would not
be able to compute the noise value.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudorandom Laplace Noise Generation Algorithm,
GeneratePseudorandomLaplaceNoise
1: Inputs: Fixed secret, s; Statistics type, statType; Entity Id, e;
Demographic (attribute, value) pair, (dattr ,dval ); Atomic time
range, Ta ; Privacy parameter, ϵ .
2: Output: Corresponding pseudorandom Laplace noise value.
3: p := GeneratePseudorandFrac(s, statType, e,dattr ,dval ,Ta )
4: laplaceRandVar := −1ϵ sgn(p − 0.5) ln(1 − 2|p − 0.5|)
5: return round(laplaceRandVar )
3.2 Canonical Noisy Count Computation
We compute the noisy count for a canonical statistical query us-
ing Algorithm 2. A canonical query takes the form shown in §2.1,
wherein the startTime and the endTime are constrained to map
to an atomic time range (discussed in §3.3). The algorithm com-
putes the true answer for the query by probing the underlying
database, and then adds a xed, rounded, pseudorandom Laplace
noise by invoking the function, GeneratePseudorandFrac (§3.1). In
case the noisy answer is negative, a count of zero is reported in-
stead to ensure consistency over time. In this manner, we ensure
that the combined action counts do not decrease over time since a
query over a longer time range could then be broken into canonical
queries, whose results could be summed up.
Algorithm 2 Canonical Noisy Count Computation Algorithm,
ComputeCanonicalNoisyCount
1: Inputs: Fixed secret, s; Statistics type, statType; Entity Id, e;
Demographic (attribute, value) pair, (dattr ,dval ); Atomic time
range, Ta ; Privacy parameter, ϵ .
2: Output: Noisy demographic level statistics value for the canon-
ical query.
3: Compute true count, trueCount of statType for entity e over
the atomic time rangeTa for the demographic (attribute, value)
pair, (dattr ,dval ).
4: noise := GeneratePseudorandomLaplaceNoise(s, statType, e,
(dattr ,dval ),Ta , ϵ)
5: return max(trueCount + noise, 0)
3.3 Privacy-preserving Analytics Computation
We next present our main algorithm for computing privacy-preserving
analytics in Algorithm 3. This algorithm computes the answer to
an arbitrary statistical query of the form shown in §2.1, achieving
a balance between privacy, consistency, and utility needs.
We rst discuss the special handling for the condition stated in
line 3 of Algorithm 3. If the entity is at a broader level and consists
of very few children entities (e.g., an ad campaign id that corre-
sponds to just 1 or 2 ads), we would like to provide consistency
across entity hierarchy (C4). The underlying rationale is that dis-
crepancy between the reported statistics for parent and children
entities would cause a poor experience in extreme cases of the
parent containing just one child or very few children. For instance,
an advertiser who creates a campaign with just one ad may even
perceive such discrepancy as a bug. However, this dierence be-
comes less pertinent as the number of children increases. Hence,
our algorithm recursively sums up the noisy counts for the children
entities when the number of children is at most the entity hierar-
chy consistency parameter, l (given as input). As l increases, we
satisfy C4 to a greater extent, although at the cost of reduced utility
(noise with larger variance is added) and increased latency (due to
a fan-out of recursive calls, possibly across multiple levels in the
entity hierarchy).
If the condition discussed above is not satised, the algorithm
rst partitions the input time range into a minimal set, ∆ of atomic
time ranges, obtains the noisy counts for each time range in ∆ using
Algorithm 2, and computes their sum (lines 6-7). Given a xed
hierarchy of time ranges, we dene an atomic time range to be a
range that exactly maps to some level in the hierarchy. For example,
let the hierarchy be specied as 3-hour epochs beginning at 12am,
3am, 6am, . . . ← day← month← quarter← year. Then, using
M/D HH:MM notation and assuming the same year, (1/1 15:00, 1/1
18:00), (1/1 00:00, 1/2 00:00), and (1/1 00:00, 4/1 00:00) are examples
of valid atomic time ranges, while (1/1 15:00, 1/1 21:00), (1/1 00:00,
1/3 00:00), and (3/31 21:00, 8/2 03:00) are not. The range, (3/31 21:00,
8/2 03:00) can be minimally partitioned into the following: (3/31
21:00, 4/1 00:00) [3-hour epoch], (4/1 00:00, 7/1 00:00) [quarter], (7/1
00:00, 8/1 00:00) [month], (8/1 00:00, 8/2 00:00) [day], and (8/2 00:00,
8/2 03:00) [3-hour epoch].
Algorithm 3 Privacy-preserving Analytics Computation Algo-
rithm, ComputeNoisyCount
1: Inputs: Fixed secret, s; Statistics type, statType; Entity Id, e;
Demographic (attribute, value) pair, (dattr ,dval ); Time range,
T ; Privacy parameter, ϵ ; Minimum threshold, τ ; Entity hierar-
chy consistency parameter, l ; Hierarchy of time ranges,Ht ime .
2: Output: Noisy demographic level statistics value.
3: if entity e is at a broader level, and corresponds to a set Ce of
at most l children entities then
4: return
∑
entity, f ∈Ce ComputeNoisyCount(s, statType, f ,
(dattr ,dval ),T , ϵ,τ , l ,Ht ime )
5: else
6: PartitionT into a minimal set ∆ of atomic time ranges based
on the time range hierarchyHt ime .
7: noisyCount :=
∑
Ta ∈∆ComputeCanonicalNoisyCount(s,
statType, e, (dattr ,dval ),Ta , ϵ)
8: if noisyCount < τ then
9: noisyCount := 0
10: return noisyCount
The above partition-based approach is chosen for the following
reasons. First, it provides better utility for longer time range queries
(by adding noise with smaller variance) while partially sacricing
consistency over time (C2), as discussed more in §6. Second, it
helps with privacy guarantees by bounding the number of time
range queries involving a given member action event. For a given
demographic attribute/value predicate and entity, each event would
only be part of at most as many queries as levels in the time range
hierarchy. In this context, the partitioning of the time range into a
minimal set of atomic time ranges can be thought of as analogous
to the binary counting mechanism proposed in [8]. Finally, our
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partitioning approach protects against the time range split-based
averaging privacy attack in which an attacker could average out the
noise for a given time range query by splitting the time range into
two halves at dierent intermediate points, obtaining the sum of
the noisy counts for each such pair of queries, and then averaging
these sums to reliably estimate the true count for the original time
range query (this is similar to the split averaging attack in [17]).
Before returning the result, we apply a minimum threshold based
post-processing step: if the noisy count is below the given minimum
threshold parameter, τ , we report a count of zero instead (lines 8-9).
As discussed in §6, we suppress small counts as these may not have
sucient validity. We can achieve a balance between privacy, valid-
ity, and product coverage needs by varying the privacy parameter,
ϵ and the threshold parameter, τ : If stronger privacy is desired,
we could choose a smaller ϵ , and thereby add noise with a larger
variance, due to which small counts may have lesser validity. We
could then opt to suppress them using a larger τ , thereby reducing
product coverage (fewer demographic breakdowns).
We can derive the eective privacy guarantee assuming that
noisy answers to every possible canonical query is published. Al-
gorithm 3 can then be viewed as post-processing this published
dataset, which does not incur further dierential privacy loss. De-
note the number of demographic attributes of interest by nattr ,
the number of levels in the time range hierarchy by nt ime , and
the number of levels in the entity hierarchy by nent . Each mem-
ber action (e.g., a member clicking on an ad) contributes to at
most nattr · nt ime · nent canonical queries, and hence the overall
event-level dierential privacy loss can be shown to be bounded
by nattr · nt ime · nent · ϵ using composition theorem [13]. Note
that such a theoretical guarantee is under worst case assumptions,
and may not be meaningful in practice (e.g., as large as 36 for six
demographic attributes (nattr = 6), three time range levels of 3-
hour epoch← day← month (nt ime = 3), and two entity levels
(e.g., campaign and account, nent = 2) with ϵ = 1). In addition,
this guarantee is for event-level, and not for user-level dierential
privacy.
3.4 Discussion of Consistency Checks
Depending on the specic analytics or reporting application, we
may apply post-processing steps to ensure consistency, and other
algorithmic modications.
Consistency for repeated queries (C1): is always ensured due to
the application of pseudorandom noise.
Consistency over time (C2): The thresholding step in Algorithm 2
is performed towards achieving C2, although C2 may be violated
when the time range partitioning proceeds to a broader atomic time
range in the hierarchy (e.g., the addition of the last day of March
could introduce a quarter in the place of months/days, causing
potential violation of C2).
Consistency between total and breakdowns (C3): In many practical
analytics settings, there would be a long tail of breakdowns not
captured by the top few values that are displayed in the application.
Consequently, the sum of the top few breakdown values is typically
considerably less than the total count, which is likely to be preserved
even with noise addition. Further, in certain cases, a member could
be associated with multiple values for the same attribute (e.g., a
Figure 1: Privacy-preserving Analytics System Architecture
member with the job title, ‘Founder and CEO’ could belong to both
‘Founder’ and ‘CXO’ seniority levels), and hence C3 may not hold
even for true counts.
Consistency across entity hierarchy (C4): As discussed in §3.3, C4
is partially satised.
Consistency across action hierarchy (C5): We chose to not focus on
C5 for two reasons: (1) As the count for a parent action is typically
at least an order of magnitude times the count for a child action
(e.g., far more impressions than clicks), noise addition is less likely
to have an eect on C5. (2) Due to possible time delays between
parent and child actions (e.g., a conversion could happen a few
days after an ad click), it is possible for C5 to not hold for a given
reporting period.
Consistency for top k queries (C6): If we compute the entire his-
togram of counts for a given attribute, C6 would be satised since
we would be using the same ranked list of all values based on the
noisy counts. However, when the number of possible values is large
(e.g., there are hundreds of thousands of companies and over 25K
titles), computing the entire noisy histogram could be computation-
ally expensive. One potential heuristic is to obtain the top kmax
values using true counts (thereby deviating from dierential pri-
vacy guarantees) for a suciently large kmax , and then reorder
after adding noise, thereby satisfying C6 for all k ≤ kmax .
4 PRIVACY-PRESERVING ANALYTICS
SYSTEM DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE
We describe the overall design and architecture of the privacy-
preserving analytics computation system deployed as part of LinkedIn
products. Our system consists of an online component that provides
an interactive interface (or API) for presenting dierent types of
analytics about member actions, and an oine/nearline component
for generating the necessary tables containing the granular mem-
ber actions (events). Figure 1 presents the key components of our
system.
Analytics Computation Workows: The tables needed for com-
puting dierent analytics about member actions are stored as part
of LinkedIn’s Pinot system. Pinot is a realtime distributed OLAP
datastore, designed to deliver realtime analytics with low latency
in a scalable manner [29]. Two workows are set up to process raw
tracking data (in the form of various Kafka [26] events generated
from the member facing application, such as impressions as well
as actions including clicks and conversions) and compute partially
aggregated analytics, which are combined and ingested into the
Pinot system. The rst workow is run daily in an oine fashion
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to compute the analytics for the previous day and persist to the
datastore. The second workow is run every few hours in an ‘on-
line’ fashion to compute intra-day incremental changes. The data
pushed to Pinot contains several key elds including the granular
time range, entity (and its hierarchy, if applicable), demographic
attribute and value, and impression counts and dierent types of
action counts. This data is ne-grained, and is aggregated corre-
sponding to the analytics request arising from the web interface or
the API.
Online System for Presenting Analytics: Our online system uses a
service oriented architecture for retrieving and presenting privacy-
preserving analytics about member actions corresponding to the
request from the user facing product (web interface) or API. First,
this request is issued to the ‘Query Interface’ component (step
1), which processes and transforms the request into underlying
database queries, which are then passed to the ‘Privacy Mechanism’
component (step 2). This component obtains the true answers to
these queries by probing the Pinot system (steps 3a & 4a), generates
the appropriate noise (steps 3b & 4b), performs post-processing
consistency checks following Algorithm 3, and returns the set of
noisy counts (step 5), which are presented to the calling service
(step 6).
5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We next present an empirical evaluation of our system, PriPeARL,
for computing privacy-preserving analytics for the LinkedIn Ad
Analytics & Reporting platform.
5.1 LinkedIn Ad Targeting & Analytics
Overview
We rst give an overview of ad targeting and analytics at LinkedIn,
which sets the context for our experiments.
AdTargeting. LinkedIn Marketing Solutions (LMS) is a platform
for advertisers to create ad campaigns targeting their audiences.
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the ad campaign targeting interface.
An advertiser can create an account on LMS, setup a campaign and
then select the audience they want to reach. There can be multiple
ads (‘creatives’) under the same campaign. To allow for exible and
eective ad targeting, LMS provides several criteria to match the
audience, such as location, company size, industry, job title, and
school.
Ad Analytics. After setting up a campaign with one or more
ads, the advertiser, or account owner, can monitor the performance
of the campaign over dierent time periods by using the LMS
Ad Analytics & Reporting platform. The common key metrics re-
ported include impressions, clicks, conversions, and amount spent,
as shown in Figure 3. Besides viewing these metrics in aggregate
for the whole campaign, the advertiser can also break them down
by certain dimensions such as Job Title, Job Seniority, Function, In-
dustry, Company, Company Size, and Location. This oers insights
on the most engaged audience segments, and hence is valuable
for the advertiser to understand their audience and optimize their
targeting.
We deployed our privacy-preserving analytics computation sys-
tem as part of LMS to prevent potential privacy attacks (§2.2) while
continuing to provide valuable insights to advertisers.
Figure 2: Ad campaign and audience targeting
Figure 3: Ad analytics
5.2 Experimental Setup
We performed our experiments using ad analytics data from De-
cember 2017. This data contains key elds such as the granular
time range, account id, campaign id, creative (ad) id, demographic
attribute and value, impression counts, click counts, and conver-
sion counts. As discussed in §4, this data is aggregated based on
the analytics request and presented to the advertisers. The report-
ing platform oers both the total counts and various demographic
breakdowns of the metrics. Since the total counts for metrics such
as clicks and conversions can be accurately tracked by the adver-
tisers on their site, we chose to report the true total counts, but
add noise only to the demographic breakdowns. Specically, we
focus on queries for computing the number of impressions and
the number of clicks for each (account, campaign, demographic
category, demographic value) combination present in the dataset.
We rst examine some statistics of the input data.
• The daily input data has tens of millions of records on aver-
age, corresponding to several tens of thousands of accounts and
several hundreds of thousands of ads (creatives).
• Some demographic breakdowns are more granular than the oth-
ers. For example, there are hundreds of thousands of possible
values for Company, over 25K values for the (standardized) Job
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(a) True impression and click distribution.
Vertical lines show the means.
(b) Absolute and signed errors with vary-
ing epsilon (ϵ )
(c) Distributions of added noise (ϵ =
1;minthreshold, τ = 0)
(d) Absolute error with varying min
threshold
(e) Signed error with varying min thresh-
old
(f) Jaccard distance for impression top-n
queries
Figure 4: Performance evaluation with ad analytics data
Title, but only about 10 possible values for Company Size and
Job Seniority. As a result, the true counts for queries tend to vary
widely across categories, e.g., impression and click counts for a
specic Title are generally much lower than those for a Seniority
level.
• Figure 4a shows the true distributions of daily impression and
click counts for all queries returning non-zero counts. As can
be seen, the distributions are long-tailed, with small medians
of 1 or 2. This is because many of the demographic attribute
values are very ne grained, with relatively less engagement.
Note that in our application, we report only the top-10 values
for each demographic attribute, so that most of the attribute
values with small true counts are not surfaced to the end users.
However, since these distributions resemble many other real-
world distributions, we use them in their entirety to evaluate the
performance of our system.
5.3 Experiments
We studied the performance of our system on ad analytics queries
with dierent choices of the privacy parameter, ϵ (Expt. 1) and
the minimum threshold parameter for reporting, τ (Expt. 2). Then,
we investigated the eect of the privacy mechanism on the top-
n queries. For the rst two experiments, we measured both the
absolute error, Errabs = |noisy_count −true_count |, and the signed
error, Errsдn = (noisy_count − true_count). The average absolute
error is a measure of the overall accuracy and can be used to evaluate
the utility, while the average signed error indicates how biased the
reported values are (signed error = 0 means no bias). Note that the
minimum threshold, τ is set to 0 by default.
Expt. 1: Tradeo between privacy and utility. In this exper-
iment, we varied the privacy parameter ϵ from 0.1 to 5, for impres-
sion and click queries. Figure 4b shows the average absolute and
signed errors vs. ϵ . As expected, we observed a tradeo between
privacy and utility, with higher ϵ leading to less accurate results
for both types of queries. With ϵ ≥ 1, the average absolute errors
are less than 1. While the average signed error is indeed less than
the average absolute error as expected, we also observe that the
average signed error is positive, due to the eect of setting negative
noisy counts to 0 (so that we do not return negative counts). The
average signed errors reduce to almost 0 when ϵ ≥ 1 because the
added noise then has lower variance and hence is less likely to lead
to a negative noisy count.
We veried this behavior by plotting the distribution of the
absolute error and the signed error for impressions with ϵ = 1
and τ = 0, as shown in Figure 4c. We can see that the variance
is small for both types of errors – ∼95% of queries have errors
with magnitude at most 2. It is interesting to see the eect of the
minimum threshold on both errors. Note that if the noise added is
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≥ −1 then the noisy count is non-negative (i.e., no need to set to
0). For the absolute error, the mode is 1, instead of 0, because for
queries with true count of 1 (the most prevalent) and noise added
< −1, the noisy count is set to 0, resulting in an absolute error
of 1. For the signed error, setting to 0 happens when noise = −2
and true count = 1, which eectively changes the signed error
from −2 to −1. Similarly, when noise = −3 and true count = 1, the
reported value is 0, eectively changing the signed error from −3
to −1. Overall there is a “shift” of signed error of -2 or less, towards
the right-hand side, causing the noisy counts to have a small but
positive bias – the average per-query signed error in this case is
0.07.
Expt. 2: Varying minimum threshold. We studied the eect
of varying minimum threshold τ in the range from 0 to 10. Note
that the value of τ should be decided based on the business need in
terms of the desired tradeo between coverage and validity. While
it makes sense to only report non-negative counts, in some cases, it
can be desirable to report values over a certain positive threshold.
Noisy counts with small magnitude have a low signal to noise ratio,
and hence can cause the user to draw conclusions without sucient
validity. Note that τ = 0 is eectively the same as τ = 1, since the
minimum positive reporting value is 1 and the rest is suppressed to
0.
We considered three values of ϵ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1} and computed
the average absolute and signed errors for impression queries for
dierent choices of τ (shown in Figures 4d and 4e respectively).
As τ is increased, the absolute errors are less sensitive for small ϵ
(0.1), but vary signicantly for large ϵ (1). A possible explanation is
that when ϵ = 0.1, the magnitude of the added noise is comparable
to or larger than τ in the experiment range so that the eect of
thresholding is masked by the noise. On the other hand, for large ϵ ,
the noise is small, and a large minimum threshold τ could result in
many small true counts (i.e., less than τ ) to be suppressed to 0 since
their noisy counts are likely to be less than τ . The signed errors
have the trend of decreasing as τ increases (Figure 4e). This is due
to the eect of suppression to 0 for most of the true counts (which
mostly belong to the range [1,10]). These signed errors indicate the
extent to which the reported counts are biased (0 means no bias). If
unbiased results are desired, these results suggest setting τ to 0 or
1 for ϵ = 1, to about 3 for ϵ = 0.5, and to even larger than 10 for
ϵ = 0.1.
Expt. 3: Evaluating top-n queries. A common use case in
our application is to compute top-n queries for each demographic
breakdown, to determine the audience segment most engaged with
a given ad campaign. We hence evaluated the accuracy of results
from top-n queries for impressions with varying n. We computed
Jaccard distance, dened as 1 − |A ∩ B |/|A ∪ B |, where A is the set
of true top-n results and B is the set of noisy top-n results, for each
query, and averaged across all queries. Note that for any query with
fewer than n results, we return the same whole set with or without
adding noise so that Jaccard distance equals 0. About 50% of queries
in our dataset fall into this category. Hence, we focus on queries
with more than 10 values, to examine the accuracy of top-n results
from the noisy counts. As a result, the reported errors are larger
than what we would observe in practice.
Figure 4f shows the average Jaccard distance vs. n for ϵ =
0.1, 0.5, 1, 3. We observe that the average Jaccard distance roughly
varies between 0.1 and 0.5 depending on ϵ and n. As expected,
Jaccard distance becomes larger as ϵ gets smaller or equivalently
as noise with larger variance is added. We also observe that Jac-
card distance increases when n increases for larger values of ϵ , but
decreases with n for ϵ = 0.1.
6 LESSONS LEARNED IN PRACTICE
We next present the challenges encountered and the lessons learned
through the production deployment of our privacy-preserving an-
alytics computation system as part of the LinkedIn Ad Analytics
and Reporting platform for more than one year.
Business requirements and usability considerations. We
discuss how we took into account key business and usability fac-
tors when deploying the privacy-preserving mechanisms to the ad
analytics application.
Semantic consistency vs. unbiased, unrounded noise: Laplace mech-
anism for satisfying dierential privacy involves noise drawn from
a continuous distribution with mean of zero, so that the expectation
of the noisy count would be the same as the true count. However,
without any post processing, the noisy counts could be negative,
while the users would expect to see cardinal numbers for counts.
Although it would be ideal to add unbiased (i.e., with mean of zero)
and unrounded noise to the true counts, we chose to round the
noise, and also cap the reported noisy count to be at least zero, to
avoid confusion for the end users.
Consistency vs. utility trade-o: In the initial version, we com-
puted daily noisy counts as part of an oine workow and persisted
them to storage. We then aggregated these counts whenever the
analytics is requested over a multi-day range. This implementation
has advantages including simplicity of implementation, ease of de-
bugging and maintenance, and consistency. For instance, we could
retrieve the stored noisy count values for debugging any frontend
issues or investigating problems reported by users. The compu-
tation cost is one-time as part of the oine workow, instead of
incurring potential latency at query time. Also, the query results
would be consistent across dierent time ranges. However, one
main disadvantage of this approach is that the variance of the noise
added increases with the time range, causing the noisy count to be
less reliable for queries over a longer time range such as one month
or one quarter. In our application, the users are typically interested
in the performance of their ad campaigns over its lifetime rather
than just on individual days. Given such usage behavior, we decided
to move to an online implementation, with a hierarchical approach
for time range queries (e.g., 3-hour epoch← day←month← quar-
ter← . . .), trading o consistency for better utility. Further, the
analytics for the current day are also computed over completed,
discrete time epochs to prevent averaging attacks. For example,
assume that a day is broken into 3-hour epochs, the third epoch
(6am - 9am) statistics becomes available at 9:30am, and the fourth
epoch (9am - 12pm) statistics becomes available at 12:15pm. Then,
between 9:30am and 12:15pm, the current day analytics will make
use of only the rst three epochs, and hence remain unchanged.
Suppression of small counts: The analytics and reporting appli-
cations at LinkedIn involve reporting of aggregate statistics over
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pre-determined and known sets of attribute values such as the set
of standardized titles, the set of companies, and the set of regions. In
other words, revealing the attribute value (e.g., “Research Scientist”)
as part of the reported analytics does not violate the privacy of a
member. This is in contrast to applications such as releasing search
queries [25], wherein the search query itself may be private, and
hence it is not desirable to reveal queries with small counts.
However, we chose to suppress small counts for the following rea-
son. The relative distortion due to the added noise will be large for
attribute values with small counts, and hence the reported counts
may not have sucient validity for the purposes of observing pat-
terns and making inferences.
Online computation and performance requirements. The
implementation of the online pipeline to compute noisy analytics
on the y imposes strict latency requirements. We did a few iter-
ations to optimize the noise computation code for performance.
For instance, we chose to implement the function, GeneratePseu-
dorandFrac in §3.1 following the approach of applying an ecient
hash function and then scaling to (0, 1) range using optimized oat-
ing point computations (e.g., using double instead of BigDecimal
type). These modications helped reduce latency signicantly, re-
sulting in a responsive user experience when interacting with the
ads analytics web interface.
Scaling across analytics applications. We rst developed
our system for preserving privacy in the context of the LinkedIn
Ad Analytics and Reporting platform. In the course of rening
our approaches to suit the privacy and product requirements, we
chose to design our system to be broadly applicable and scalable
across various analytics applications at LinkedIn. Consequently, we
abstracted the application-independent functionality into a stand-
alone library so that this library could be invoked as part of other
analytics applications. For example, the functions for generating
pseudorandom noise given query parameters are not specic to
any one application, and hence are included as part of this library.
7 RELATEDWORK
Privacy Techniques: Preserving user privacy is paramount when
computing and releasing answers to aggregate statistical queries
issued to a database containing sensitive user data. There is rich lit-
erature in the eld of privacy-preserving data mining spanning dif-
ferent research communities (e.g., [2–4, 15, 21, 23, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34]),
as well as on the limitations of simple anonymization techniques
(e.g., [5, 30, 32]) and on privacy attacks and challenges in ad target-
ing [24]. Based on the lessons learned from the privacy literature,
we decided to make use of the rigorous notion of dierential pri-
vacy [10, 11] in our problem setting. A key challenge we faced was
the fact that the analytics need to be provided on a continual basis
over time. Although the application of dierential privacy under
continual observations has been studied theoretically [8, 12], we
have not come across any practical implementations or applications
of these techniques.
Privacy Systems in Practice: Several systems have been developed
in both academic and industrial settings to address the privacy
needs, especially focusing on regulations such as GDPR [22]. We
discuss a few systems that have been either implemented or de-
ployed in practice, and contrast them with our system. Aircloak’s
Dix is a database anonymization system designed recently to ad-
dress GDPR requirements, allow a broad class of unlimited queries,
and provide answers to several statistical functions with minimal
distortion [17]. Although this system also makes use of determinis-
tic, pseudo-random noise as in our approach, there are a few key
dierences. First, the queries issued in analytics application settings
at LinkedIn follow a specic type of syntax corresponding to the
product user interface and the exposed APIs, unlike the general
class of statistical queries Dix attempts to answer. Consequently,
we could apply the rigorous notion of (event-level) dierential pri-
vacy whereas Dix does not have a formal treatment. In fact, it
has been recently shown that the noise used by Dix leaks infor-
mation about the underlying data since the noise depends on the
set of records that match the query conditions [18]. Finally, our
system has been deployed as part of LinkedIn’s analytics platform
and our experiments are based on real world data, while simula-
tions are performed in Dix [17]. FLEX is a system designed to
enforce dierential privacy for SQL queries using elastic sensitiv-
ity, and has been adopted by Uber for internal data analytics [20].
The key focus in this work is on computing the sensitivity (elastic
sensitivity) for a broad class of SQL queries, whereas the queries
allowed by our system follow a specic form, and have sensitiv-
ity of 1. We also explored approaches similar to recent work at
Google [14, 16], Apple [1, 6, 19], and Microsoft [9] on privacy-
preserving data collection at scale that focuses on applications such
as learning statistics about how unwanted software is hijacking
users’ settings in Chrome browser, discovering the usage patterns
of a large number of iOS users for improving the touch keyboard,
and collecting application usage statistics in Windows devices re-
spectively. These approaches leverage local dierential privacy,
building on techniques such as randomized response [36] and re-
quire response from typically hundreds of thousands of users for
the results to be useful. In contrast, even the larger of our reported
groups contain only a few thousand data points, and hence these
approaches are not applicable in our setting.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We studied the problem of computing robust, reliable, privacy-
preserving analytics for web-scale applications. We presented the
design and architecture of PriPeARL, which powers analytics appli-
cations at LinkedIn including LinkedIn Ad Analytics and Reporting
platform. We highlighted unique challenges such as the simultane-
ous need for preserving member privacy, product coverage, utility,
and data consistency, and how we addressed them in our system
using mechanisms based on dierential privacy. We presented the
empirical tradeos between privacy and utility needs over a web-
scale ad analytics dataset. We also discussed the design decisions
and tradeos while building our system, and the lessons learned
from more than one year of production deployment at LinkedIn.
Our framework should be of broad interest for designing privacy-
preserving analytics and reporting in other application settings.
A broad direction for future work would be to create a taxonomy
of web-scale analytics and reporting applications, and study the
applicability of dierent privacy approaches (e.g., interactive query-
ing mechanisms vs. data perturbation and publishing methods) for
each class of applications in the taxonomy. Another direction would
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be to associate a notion of utility with the availability / correctness
of dierent types of statistics, and to formulate as a utility max-
imization problem given constraints on the ‘privacy loss budget’
per user. For example, we could explore adding more noise (i.e.,
noise with larger variance) to impressions but less noise to clicks (or
conversions) since the number of impressions is at least an order of
magnitude larger than say, the number of clicks. Similarly, we could
explore adding more noise to broader time range sub-queries and
less noise to granular time range sub-queries towards maximizing
utility.
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